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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CLINT DONALD YOUNG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 950350-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
TESTIMONY OP OTHER BAD ACTS IN VIOLATION OF 
RULES 404(b) AND 403, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
A. Defendant's motion in limine adequately preserved for appeal 
the issue of inadmissibility of other bad acts under rule 
404(b) and 403. 
The State first contends that regardless of the correctness 
or incorrectness of the trial court's ruling on the admissibility 
of Holly Hales' testimony, the issue was not properly preserved 
for appeal. Although Young originally raised the Rule 404(b) and 
403 issues in a motion in limine, argues the State, his failure 
to renew the objection during trial, in accordance with Utah Rule 
of Evidence 103(a), constituted a waiver of any objection and 
thus precludes him from raising the issues on appeal. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held, however, that a 
defendant is not required to object or renew his or her objection 
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at trial to preserve the issue for appeal when a pretrial motion 
regarding the issue was made, when the trial judge was the same 
judge who ruled on the pretrial motion, and when the transcript 
indicates that a hearing on the motion was held. See State v. 
Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Utah 1987); State v. Mitchell, 
779 P.2d 1116, 1119 n.4 (Utah 1989); State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 
1221, 1229 n.9 (Utah 1989). 
Each of the elements of the Johnson test have been 
satisfied. First, Young outlined his objections to the 
admissibility of other bad acts in a pretrial motion to limit the 
admissibility of evidence (R. 32-38). Second, Judge Boyd L. Park 
both ruled on the motion and presided over the trial.1 Third, a 
hearing regarding Young's motion was held during trial. Thus 
according to Johnson, Young was not required to renew his 404(b) 
or 4 03 objections or otherwise alert the court at the time of the 
trial. The objections set forth in Young's motion in limine were 
sufficient to preserve the issues for appeal. 
Moreover, on appeal, Young has also argued that the trial 
court's erroneous admission of Hales' testimony constituted 
"plain error"--error that was both obvious and prejudicial (Br. 
of Appellant at 13-14 n.2, 14-15). See also, infra. 
*In a pretrial memorandum decision issued on January 13, 
1995, Judge Park ruled "Defendant's Motion in Limine will be 
considered at the time of trial, outside of the presence of the 
jury and before counsel for plaintiff seeks to inquire into areas 
covered by rules 403, 404 and 609" (R. 56). 
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B. The trial court inappropriately admitted evidence in 
violation of rule 404(b) when the State, in introducing such 
evidence, exceeded the scope of the permission granted by 
the trial court regarding the 404(b) evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that "evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of. . . opportunity . . . [or] 
identity. . . . " Aware of the significance of this rule and the 
effects that admitting such evidence might have on the outcome of 
the trial, the court, in ruling on Defendant's preliminary motion 
to suppress evidence, instructed the State "not [to] inquire into 
other crimes, wrongs or bad acts of the defendant at the time of 
trial without first acquiring the court's permission to do so" 
(R. 56). 
When, during trial, State's counsel followed such 
instructions and requested that Holly Hales' testimony be 
introduced to show "identity" under rule 404(b), (2/15/94 Tr. at 
345) the court indicated that the evidence the State intended to 
bring out in Hales' testimony more appropriately showed 
opportunity, rather than identity. The court then indicated that 
it would grant permission and allow such testimony, but further 
instructed the prosecution that it would do so only for the 
purpose of showing opportunity (2/15/95 Tr. at 357). 
Upon questioning Hales, however, the State exceeded the 
scope of the trial court's permission. Rather than limiting 
testimony to Hales' recalling that she had seen Young in 
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possession of a check from the same account as that used in the 
forgery committed at Albertson's (testimony that would 
appropriately show opportunity), the State elicited further 
testimony from Hales that did not show opportunity- Hales' 
further testimony consisted of statements that Young, whom she 
had known since childhood, had committed forgery against her and 
GGG Foods using a check from the same account as had been used in 
the Albertson's forgery, and that she had been fired as result of 
her acceptance of the bad check from Young (2/15/95 Tr. at 202-
208). In addition, Hales was allowed to testify that Young had 
even called her after the incident to apologize (2/15/95 Tr. at 
208) . 
Although Hales' testimony that she saw Young with a check 
from the same account as the one used at Albertsons does show 
opportunity as permitted by rule 404(b), her further testimony 
does not. The extraneous facts to which Hales also testified--
her childhood familiarity with Young, his commission of a similar 
fraud against her at her place of employment, her subsequent loss 
of employment, and Young's subsequent phone call and apology to 
Hales--were all irrelevant in showing opportunity. Such 
testimony exceeded the scope of rule 404(b) and the permission 
granted by the court, and thus should have been excluded. 
C. The trial court erroneously admitted Hales' testimony since 
such testimony was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. 
Even if Hales' extraneous testimony is considered relevant 
to showing opportunity, such evidence should have been excluded 
as it violated Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 provides that 
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relevant evidence may be excluded if "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice...." 
Indeed, the testimony offered by Hales was unfairly 
prejudicial. As stated by the court in State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 
880, 883 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993), 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to 
influence the outcome of the trial by improper means or if 
it appeals to the juries sympathies or arouses its sense of 
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes 
a jury to base its decision on something other than the 
established propositions of the case. 
See also State v. Lindaren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1996) . 
Hales' testimony satisfies the criteria set forth by Burk. Her 
testimony "influenced the outcome of the trial by improper means" 
by intimating that Young must have been the one who committed the 
forgery at Albertson's. It "aroused [the jury's] sense of horror 
[and] provoke [d] its instinct to punish" because it suggested 
that Young likely commits forgeries on a regular basis. 
Furthermore, it caused "the jury to base its decision on 
something other than the established propositions of the case" 
since it brought to the jury's attention the alleged commission 
of separate--but similar--criminal conduct admitted to by Young 
for which he should be punished (2/15/95 Tr. at 202-208). The 
prejudice created by Hale's testimony substantially outweighed 
any probative value that may have existed, and thus should have 
been excluded. 
Moreover, this error was obvious. Since 1988, Utah 
appellate courts have repeatedly held that before evidence is 
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admissible under Rule 404(b) it must be considered in light of 
the requirements of Rule 403 the trial court's failure to conduct 
such an inquiry must be considered "obvious" error. See State v. 
Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1989); State v. Shickles. 760 
P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988); State v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 701 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994). 
Young's assertion that Hales' testimony should have been 
excluded as inadmissible under rule 403 is further supported by 
the Utah Supreme Court's determination in State v. Dibello. 780 
P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989), that when evidence is "subject to 
being used to distort the deliberative process and skew the 
trial's outcome, . . . [relevant evidence's] potential for 
unfair prejudice is presumed to outweigh its probativeness, and 
the burden is on the proponent to show that such is not so." See 
also State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Utah 1996). 
As illustrated above, much of Hales' testimony had the 
propensity to "distort the deliberative process and skew the 
trial's outcome" because of it's prejudicial nature and because 
it allowed the jury to base it's decision on evidence that did 
not tend to show opportunity under rule 404(b). Thus the trial 
court should have presumed Hales' testimony to be prejudicial and 
excluded it as such, since no evidence to the contrary was 
proffered. 
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D. T!i error in admitting the evidence was harmful. 
The State contends that any error that was committed in 
admitting Hales' testimony was harmless- Error is considered 
harmful "if absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of 
an outcome more favorable to the defendant." State v. Lindaren, 
910 P.2d at 1271. The likelihood of a more favorable outcome is 
dependant upon the overall strength of the State's case. State 
v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah App. 1994). Accordingly, 
"the more evidence supporting the verdict, the less likely there 
was harmful error" and the less evidence sustaining the verdict, 
the more likely it is that harmful error existed. State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). 
Although the State presented evidence which may have 
suggested Young's guilt, this evidence was significantly weakened 
in several respects, indicating the existence of harmful error. 
First, both Johnson and Knighton testified that Young was the one 
who cashed the check at Albertson's. However there were 
significant difference's in the witnesses' descriptions of Young. 
Johnson, for example, testified that the individual who presented 
the check and driver's license was wearing levi's, a blue tank 
top, and cowboy boots, and that while the photo in the driver's 
license had a beard, the person who presented the check was clean 
shaven (2/25/95 Tr. at 97, 101, 102). Knighton, on the other 
hand, testified that Young was wearing a cowboy hat, as well as 
cowboy boots, and that he had a large mustache or goatee (2/15/95 
Tr. at 110, 111, 114). 
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Furthermore, Johnson admitted that he served approximately 
100-300 individuals per day (2/15/95 Tr. at 272). This indicates 
that between the time the check was cashed and the time an 
officer returned with a photo for identification, Johnson had 
seen perhaps as many as 3000 individuals. Moreover, although 
Johnson positively identified Young from a photo shown to him by 
Detective Nielson, Nielson admitted that only one picture was 
shown to Johnson, rather than several from which Johnson might 
choose the offender, and that this was not the best way to get an 
accurate identification (2/15/95 Tr. 320-321). In addition, 
Knighton also admitted that he saw the individual in question 
from 10 feet away, for a brief period of time, and that the 
identification took place while he was approving the check for 
acceptance (2/15/95 Tr. at 292-293). 
Second, although the State presented evidence by Chuck Senn, 
a handwriting analyst, who stated that it was "highly probable" 
that the signature on the check matched the signature on Young's 
driver's license, Senn further testified that he had difficulty 
analyzing the copy of Young's license, that he did not have 
enough writing to come to a positive conclusion, and that it was 
not uncommon to experience differences in opinion among analysts 
(2/15/95 Tr. at 335, 338, 364, 369). 
Finally, both Young and his father testified that Young has 
never owned nor worn cowboy boots or a cowboy hat (2/15/95 Tr. at 
192-193, 217, 219) and that Young had lost his driver's license 
almost a year prior to trial (2/15/95 Tr. at 193-194, 218-219). 
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Because of the weaknesses in the State's evidence, the 
prejudicial testimony of Holly Hales sufficiently bolstered the 
strength of the State's case so as to render the State more 
likely to succeed with Hales' testimony than without it. Thus, 
because a more favorable outcome to Young could reasonably have 
been foreseen had Hales' testimony not been admitted, the error 
was harmful. 
POINT II 
YOUNG WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 670, 104 S.Ct 
2052, 2056 (1984), to prove ineffective assistance of counsel a 
Defendant must show (1) that his counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for 
counsel's error. Young meets both requirements. 
A. Trial counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. 
Young asserts that counsel was ineffective in that it should 
have requested the court to balance the prejudicial nature of 
Hales' testimony against it's probative value, objected to the 
scope of the testimony of Hales, and requested a limiting jury 
instruction to clarify how Hales' testimony was to be used. 
Because counsel failed to do any of these, his assistance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. This is supported 
by the fact that the trial court itself, during a bench 
conference immediately after direct questioning of Hales, told 
the State that the court "would have probably stopped [it] 
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quicker on a couple of questions. . . . " (2/15/95 Tr. at 394). 
The fact that the court itself indicated that portions of Hales' 
testimony should have been limited or excluded in some way, 
confirms that Young's counsel should reasonably have known to 
request himself that Hales' testimony be limited, and that 
representation fell below a reasonable standard. 
B. A reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to the 
accused existed. 
Young further satisfies the second element of Strickland 
since, as discussed in Point I, D supra, had Hales' testimony 
been excluded or limited, a reasonable probability of a more 
favorable result existed. In this case, the adversarial process 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. For the 
same reasons the trial court's error was harmful, Young's trial 
counsel's deficiencies were likewise prejudicial, and therefore, 
this Court's confidence in the verdict must be undermined. 
Accordingly, Young asks this Court to vacate his conviction 
because he was denied his constitutional right to effective 
counsel. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, because of the trial 
court's error in admitting prejudicial testimony of a prior 
criminal act, and because of trial court's ineffectiveness, this 
Court should vacate Young's conviction and remand the case for a 
new trial. 
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11 DATED this (y^ day of May, 1996. 
Attorney for Young 
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